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INTRODUCTION
Companies often require confidentiality from their employees.
Maintaining corporate secrets helps protect intellectual property and
gives a company an edge in a competitive marketplace.1 The law
generally supports this corporate desire for secrecy through statutes
that prohibit disclosing trade secrets and by enforcing agreements
requiring confidentiality from employees, even if those agreements
bar employees from working for a competitor in order to keep the
employees from revealing secrets.2 As a result, companies have

* © 2018 Richard Moberly.
** Dean and Richard & Catherine Schmoker Professor of Law, University of
Nebraska College of Law. Thank you to Nate Bray and Williamette Gallagher for
providing helpful research assistance.
1. See Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements
Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 634–39 (1999); Stephen E. Darling,
Confidential Settlements: The Defense Perspective, 55 S.C. L. REV. 785, 786–87 (2004).
2. See Bast, supra note 1, at 634–39.
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utilized this legal structure aggressively to enforce trade secret laws,
confidentiality agreements, and non-competition provisions.3
Whistleblowing can undermine confidentiality. An employee
blows the whistle by revealing inside information—often
organizational misconduct—to an outsider, such as a government
regulator.4 This disclosure, by definition, contains information the
corporation would rather keep secret. Even if a company intends to
correct and punish the underlying misconduct internally,
whistleblowing can cause significant disruption because the company
has to manage increased oversight from the government, bad
publicity, and heightened public scrutiny.5 Once the information is
revealed externally, companies can have a harder time fixing the
underlying problem because battle lines are drawn and positions
become entrenched. Nevertheless, over the last fifteen years, the
law—in particular federal law—has increasingly encouraged
whistleblowing as a means of corporate oversight.6 Newly enacted
federal statutes broadly protect whistleblowers from retaliation,
require corporate structures that make whistleblowing easier, and

3. Although no one disputes, for example, the right of Apple to keep the inner
workings of the iPhone secret from its competitors, companies have claimed
confidentiality over even the most mundane information. One extreme example might be
the sandwich restaurant chain, Jimmy John’s, which for years included a provision in its
non-compete agreement claiming that items such as its menus and recipes were
“Confidential Information” and prohibited its minimum-wage employees from working
for another sandwich shop for two years after leaving Jimmy John’s. See Emp.
Confidentiality & Non-Competition Agreement, Jimmy John’s (Nov. 29, 2013),
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/FACExhibitA.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4DU-SKGG]
(providing a copy of Jimmy John’s employment agreement). Notably, Jimmy John’s states
that it will not enforce these agreements anymore. Jimmy John’s Will Stop Making LowWage Employees Sign Non-Compete Agreements, FORTUNE (June 22, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-non-compete-agreements/
[https://perma.cc
/J68Y-J8VT (staff-uploaded archive)]. Other examples of non-compete agreements
required of low-wage workers include restrictions on both pet sitters at Camp Bow Wow
and warehouse workers Amazon. See Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s ‘Oppressive’
Noncompete Agreement Survives Court Challenge, HUFFPOST (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/10/jimmy-johns-noncompete-agreement_n_7042112.html
[https://perma.cc/R28B-HXQS].
4. See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case of
Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985) (articulating the definition of whistleblowing
that has since become widely adopted: “the disclosure by organization members (former
or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action”).
5. See Richard Moberly, ‘To Persons or Organizations That May be Able to Effect
HANDBOOK
ON
Action’:
Whistleblowing
Recipients,
in
INTERNATIONAL
WHISTLEBLOWING RESEARCH 273, 277–78 (A.J. Brown et al. eds., 2014).
6. See infra Part I.
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even reward employees who reveal certain types of corporate
misconduct.7
In short, the federal government has aggressively encouraged
employees to become whistleblowers. In response, corporations have
tried to mitigate potential damage by relying on broad confidentiality
provisions to discourage employees from revealing insider
information. As a result, uncertainty abounds when the corporate
desire for confidentiality clashes with the government’s desire for
employees to blow the whistle.
This Article is about the increasing tension between these
countervailing trends. Part I describes the government’s increased
encouragement of whistleblowing during the last fifteen years. Part II
demonstrates that corporations have responded to this trend by
including in employment agreements broad confidentiality provisions
that potentially limit the ability of employees to become
whistleblowers. Finally, Part III explains recent moves by government
agencies to regulate the breadth of these confidentiality provisions in
order to mitigate their impact on whistleblowing. Ultimately, the
Article concludes that the government’s ability to rely on insiders to
monitor organizational behavior by blowing the whistle will depend
on the government’s willingness to regulate the ability of an
organization to protect its secrets through contract.
I. A (BRIEF) HISTORY OF WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE LAST FIFTEEN
YEARS
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to
the corporate accounting scandals at companies such as Enron and
WorldCom.8 Because whistleblowers played a crucial role in revealing
corporate misconduct at these companies (and because of the silence
of many other employees in the face of clear illegalities), SarbanesOxley included a number of provisions that, when taken together,
clearly attempted to more assertively encourage whistleblowers.9
7. See generally Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten
Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 11–21, 45–53 (2012) (giving examples of newly enacted
federal statutes protecting whistleblowers).
8. See id. at 2–3.
9. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley would address
the “corporate code of silence” that contributed to the accounting scandals); Moberly,
supra note 7, at 2–3; Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis
of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 75–76
(2007) (noting four separate provisions aimed at encouraging and protecting
whistleblowers). Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation protections later proved to be strong on
paper but not in reality. After reviewing over 700 administrative decisions under the Act, I
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First, the Act contained antiretaliation protections that applied to
more employees than other whistleblower statutes—under SarbanesOxley all employees of publicly traded companies were now included,
unlike previous statutes.10 Second, the standard for antiretaliation
provisions was employee-friendly: whistleblowers needed only to
prove their protected conduct was a “contributing factor” to an
adverse employment decision, and then employers could only escape
liability by proving a legitimate business justification with “clear and
convincing” evidence.11 Third, employees could be protected for a
wide range of conduct: the defined scope of “protected activity”
covered by the Act was potentially enormous.12 Fourth, the Act
required companies to change the way they engaged with their
employees as potential whistleblowers by implementing internal
“disclosure channels” for whistleblowers to report to their board of
directors.13
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provisions altered
the conversation about the role of whistleblowers as organizational
monitors and began a sixteen-year period in which the federal
government increasingly sought to encourage insiders to disclose
wrongdoing in a variety of ways.14 As discussed below, the
found that whistleblowers won only 3.6% of the time when an investigator decided the
case and only 6.5% of the time when the case was resolved by an administrative law judge.
See Moberly, supra, at 67.
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2012); Moberly, supra note 7, at 7. The Supreme
Court later determined that Sarbanes-Oxley also protected employees of contractors of
publicly traded companies. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176 (2014).
11. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 8–9.
12. As I have noted previously,
[t]he statute protects activity related to violations of §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343
(wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), and 1348 (securities fraud) of Title 18 of the U.S.
Code, or “any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1), (a)(2). Reports can be made to a broad range of recipients,
including Congress, law enforcement agencies, and any person internally who has
supervisory authority over the employee. Id. § 1514(a)(1)(A)–(C).
Id. at 7, n.34.
13. See id. at 10.
14. On the tenth anniversary of its enactment, I noted,
[i]n many ways, Sarbanes-Oxley represents a great leap forward for whistleblowers
in the United States, and the Act served as the model for subsequent reform.
Indeed, in the decade after its enactment, legislatures and regulators unleashed a
torrent of formal encouragement for whistleblowers. Federal and state
governments passed an impressive array of broad antiretaliation statutes and
regulators mandated the widespread use of corporate codes of ethics that explicitly
protect whistleblowers and implement whistleblower hotlines.
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government’s efforts included increasing statutory antiretaliation
protections and providing “bounties” (or rewards) for whistleblowers,
as well as mandating that organizations incorporate structural
disclosure channels into their internal compliance systems.
A. Antiretaliation Protections
In the time since Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, each of the three
branches of the federal government has taken steps to further
encourage and protect whistleblowers. Other statutes before
Sarbanes-Oxley
provided
antiretaliation
protections
for
whistleblowers; however, as noted above, Sarbanes-Oxley raised the
bar through wider application and broader protection. Since 2002, the
number of statutes including similarly strong antiretaliation
protections has increased dramatically. At least nine new federal
statutes have included similar whistleblower provisions and other
statutes updated many older antiretaliation protections.15 The three
signature laws of the Obama era—health care, the economic stimulus
package, and Wall Street reform—all contained antiretaliation
provisions.16
The Executive Branch’s oversight of whistleblower protections
has also increased during this time period. For example, in 2002, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) in the
Department of Labor enforced fourteen whistleblower laws.17 In
2017, OSHA administered twenty-two such laws.18 Indeed, OSHA
created a new Whistleblower Directorate and a Whistleblower
Protection Advisory Committee to ensure that it was meeting its new,
heightened obligations to whistleblowers appropriately.19
Significantly, in 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-

See id. at 11.
15. See id. at 12–17.
16. See id. at 17.
17. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1127 n.83 (2006).
18. See The Whistleblower Protection Programs: Statutes, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, https://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes_page.html
[https://perma.cc/HSL8-V2WB] (listing whistleblower statutes enforced by OSHA).
19. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 40; The Whistleblower Protection Programs:
Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.whistleblowers.gov/wpac.html [https://perma.cc/ZND76C33] (describing OSHA Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee). I served on
OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee from 2012 to 2016.
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Frank”)20 to address the financial crisis of 2008. Dodd-Frank
improved upon the Sarbanes-Oxley model by fixing problems with
Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections and by including its own
strong provisions.21 In particular, Dodd-Frank permitted
whistleblowers to report misconduct anonymously to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).22 Moreover, while previous laws
required whistleblowers to bring private claims if they felt retaliated
against, Dodd-Frank empowered the SEC to enforce antiretaliation
protection.23 This new power is significant: in September 2016, the
SEC brought its first stand-alone retaliation case, which resulted in
International Game Technology agreeing to pay a $500,000 penalty
for retaliating against an employee who reported to senior
management and the SEC about improprieties related to the
company’s financial statements.24 The SEC has aggressively pushed
for a broad reading of Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision. It has
filed numerous amicus briefs in federal courts arguing that an
“internal whistleblower” should be protected from retaliation under
Dodd-Frank, even though the statutory language can be read to
include protections only for whistleblowers who report directly to the
SEC.25
The Supreme Court has even joined the trend of supporting
antiretaliation protection for whistleblowers. Since 2006, the Court
has decided nine of the ten cases involving statutory retaliation claims
20. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841, 1841 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 (2012)).
21. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 16–17 (describing amendments to Sarbanes-Oxley);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
22. See § 78u-6(d)(2)(A), (h)(2)(A); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7, -9(c) (2017).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
24. See Int’l Game Tech., Exchange Act Release No. 78991, 2016 WL 5464611, at *5
(Sept. 29, 2016). In June 2014, the SEC settled a case involving a number of charges, one
of which was retaliation, for $2.2 million after it accused a hedge fund of retaliating against
one of its traders who reported securities violations to the SEC. See Paradigm Cap. Mgmt.,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 72393, 109 SEC Docket 430, 2014 WL 2704311, at *9
(June 16, 2014).
25. See OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 22
(2016), https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report2016.pdf [perma.cc/2XAK-D59R]. A circuit split has developed on this issue, with the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals requiring reports to the SEC, see Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013), and the Ninth and Second Circuits
permitting protection for whistleblowers who report internally, see Somers v. Digital
Realty Trust, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2017); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,
801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court should resolve this issue in the
2017–18 Term. See Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 137 S. Ct. 2300 (mem.) (June 26,
2016) (No-16-1276) (granting certiorari).
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in favor of the employee.26 In 2014, the Court decided its first
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower case and allowed an employee of a
contractor of a public company to assert a retaliation claim, which
dramatically extended the reach of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower
protection.27 Most recently, in 2015, the Court found in favor of a
government whistleblower who claimed he was retaliated against for
reporting problems with the way air marshals were being assigned
flights such that national security was endangered.28
All three branches of the federal government, then, have
increasingly used antiretaliation protections to encourage
whistleblowers. Congress has passed an ever-growing number of laws
that include antiretaliation provisions. The executive branch
administrative agencies—most visibly OSHA and the SEC—have
aggressively enforced those provisions through regulation and
enforcement actions.29 And, finally, the Supreme Court has signaled
that it believes “protecting employees from retaliation will enhance
the enforcement of the nation’s laws.”30
B.

Bounty Provisions

This trend of emphasizing the important role of whistleblowing
includes more than enhanced antiretaliation protections. The federal
government has increased the use of “bounties” to reward
26. See Dep’t Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 920 (2015) (interpreting the
Civil Service Reform Act); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176 (2014)
(interpreting Sarbanes-Oxley); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563
U.S. 1, 4 (2011) (interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act); Thompson v. N. Am.
Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 175–78 (2011) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 278–80
(2009) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); CBOCS W., Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 456–57 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v.
Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56–57 (2006)
(interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (interpreting Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972). The one outlier is University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133
S.Ct. 2517 (2013), which examined the standard of causation for Title VII retaliation.
However, even this case can be viewed as more of a burden of proof claim in an
employment case rather than a case examining the merits of retaliation protection. See id.
at 2522.
27. See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1176.
28. See MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 917.
29. Although I have been critical of the state of OSHA’s whistleblower protection in
the 2000s, under recent leadership OSHA has focused more energy and resources toward
its whistleblower protection programs. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 39–42.
30. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 375, 378 (2011).
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whistleblowers in addition to simply protecting them from retaliation.
The government has aggressively utilized the False Claims Act,31 the
oldest bounty statute, which encourages whistleblowers to report
fraud on the federal government by providing rewards of between
fifteen and thirty percent of money collected from fraudsters.32 In
fiscal year 2016, the federal government recovered $2.9 billion from
whistleblower qui tam suits and awarded whistleblowers $519
million.33 Since 2009, the federal government has “recovered nearly
$24 billion in settlements and judgments related to qui tam suits and
paid more than $4 billion in whistleblower awards.”34
Significantly, in 2010, Dodd-Frank included a bounty provision
for whistleblowers who report securities fraud.35 A person who
provides information about a publicly traded company to the SEC
that leads to penalties or fines exceeding $1 million may receive an
award of between ten and thirty percent of the money received by the
SEC.36 Since 2011, the SEC has awarded over $111 million to thirtyfour whistleblowers.37 The awards have increased in both number and
size since the program began: in fiscal year 2016, the SEC awarded
over $57 million to thirteen whistleblowers, and six of the ten largest
awards made under the program were made in fiscal year 2016.38
Moreover, the SEC is receiving an increasing number of tips—in
fiscal year 2016, it received over 4,200 tips, an increase of over forty
percent from 2012.39
C.

Structural Disclosure Channels

Sarbanes-Oxley also utilized what I have previously called a
“structural model” of encouraging whistleblowers.40 The Act required
each publicly traded company to implement an internal disclosure
channel for employees to report misconduct directly to the company’s
board of directors.41 This channel allows whistleblowers to bypass the
31. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
32. § 3730(d).
33. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7
Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016: Third Highest Annual Recovery
in FCA History (Dec. 14, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrecovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [perma.cc/XJ93-5NEH].
34. Id.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
36. See id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5 (2017).
37. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 25, at 1.
38. See id. at 13.
39. See id. at 1.
40. See Moberly, supra note 17, at 1109.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A).
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blocking and filtering of the report that often occurs when lower-level
supervisors and managers receive reports.42
Similarly, in the 2000s, the federal organizational sentencing
guidelines encouraged structural disclosure channels by dramatically
reducing potential criminal penalties for corporations that can
demonstrate they had implemented “an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law.”43 Effective programs required that
companies exercise due diligence, which, according to the guidelines
at the time, required “having in place and publicizing a reporting
system whereby employees and other agents could report criminal
conduct by others within the organization without fear of
retribution.”44 Although this version of the guidelines was repealed,
the 2016 version included similar language: “The organization shall
take reasonable steps . . . to have and publicize a system, which may
include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or confidentiality,
whereby the organization’s employees and agents may report or seek
guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear
of retaliation.”45
In today’s corporate America, companies commonly use
whistleblower hotlines as well as other policies and procedures set up
to encourage whistleblowers to report misconduct internally.46
Indeed, because of rules of various stock-listing exchanges, many
companies even explicitly promise not to retaliate against employees
who report misconduct internally.47
42. See Moberly, supra note 17, at 1149–50.
43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2003).
44. See id. § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k)(5).
45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
46. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 18; Impact of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions:
What Companies are Doing, SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/tabid/531/ArticleId/329/Impact-of-DoddFrank-Whistleblower-Provisions-What-Companies-Are-Doing-1.aspx [perma.cc/X6XQAYHJ] (noting results of recent survey that 99% of publicly traded companies operated a
whistleblower hotline); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ESP-15-03,
REVIEW OF THE USE OF CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONTRACTORS (2015), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/esp-15-03.pdf [perma.cc/K7BRJ3ZJ] (finding that twenty-five of thirty federal contractors reported having an internal
hotline for employees to confidentially report fraud, illegality, or violations of company
policy).
47. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 46, at 7
(noting that twenty-seven of thirty federal contractors reported having internal company
policies specifically prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers); Richard Moberly &
Lindsey E. Wylie, An Empirical Study of Whistleblower Policies in United States Corporate
Codes of Ethics, in WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 27, 29–35 (David
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Other laws incorporate a structural model of sorts. Dodd-Frank,
for example, identifies a specific reporting channel for whistleblowers
who want to receive a bounty: they must provide information directly
to the SEC.48 Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the SEC also established the
Office of the Whistleblower to receive disclosures from
whistleblowers.49
At the risk of overstatement, the last sixteen years have ushered
in a sea change in society’s approach to whistleblowers. The law more
broadly protects employees who disclose misconduct, and it
encourages such disclosures more effectively through the use of
rewards. Companies appear to invite whistleblowing through the use
of hotlines and codes of conduct that promise to protect employees
who blow the whistle. Although whistleblowing is still a long and
difficult path to choose—and one should not engage in it without
thinking through the very real likelihood of negative consequences—
the country as a whole has a different attitude towards whistleblowing
in 2018 than it did prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002.50
II. THE CORPORATE RESPONSE
Despite efforts to encourage whistleblowing, organizations such
as corporations and governments might believe they have much to
lose from this increased emphasis on whistleblowing. Most obviously,
as whistleblowers accrue more legal rights, organizations have more
exposure to liability for retaliation or for engaging in misconduct
generally. Public relations disasters such as the 2016 scandal at Wells
Fargo can engulf a company.51 Organizational secrets can be exposed
publicly: national security disclosures by Chelsea Manning, Edward
Lewis & Wim Vandekerckhove eds., 2011); Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers
by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 988–95 (2008); Moberly, supra note 7, at 18–20.
48. See Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto Gag
Clauses: The Legality of Employment Agreements That Undermine Dodd-Frank’s
Whistleblower Provisions, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87, 90–91 (2014).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 (2017).
50. See, e.g., The Age of the Whistleblower, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679455-life-getting-better-those-who-exposewrongdoing-companies-continue-fight [https://perma.cc/94KG-DYCL] (noting that this is
the “age of the whistleblower” and that “[w]histleblowing has been on the increase since
the 2007–08 financial crisis sparked a crackdown on corporate corruption and collusion”);
see also Moberly, supra note 7, at 20–21 (noting that the “culture around whistleblowing
has changed in the last decade, making it more acceptable and formally encouraged”).
51. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Reports on Wells Fargo Whistleblowers Spark Inquiry in
Congress, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/30/507597691
/for-whistleblowers-repercussions-are-felt-beyond-wells-fargo
[https://perma.cc/3DDJSTP2] (describing how Wells Fargo pressured employees to “open[] as many as 2 million
credit card and checking accounts in customers’ names without their approval”).
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Snowden, and others have forever changed the way we think about
whistleblowing’s relationship with secrecy and confidentiality.52 One
way that corporations have responded to the federal government’s
increased encouragement of whistleblowers is by using confidentiality
provisions that undermine the employees’ willingness to blow the
whistle.53 As shown below, an empirical study of such provisions
indicates that corporations use such provisions frequently to target
and limit whistleblowing.
A. Using Confidentiality Provisions
Confidentiality provisions can appear in severance agreements,
policy handbooks, and settlement agreements, among other things.
To be clear, it would be unusual for an employer to explicitly restrict
an employee’s ability to report illegality to the government—such a
provision would clearly be unenforceable and violate public policy
constraints on contracting.54
However, employers have devised other ways to disincentivize
employees from blowing the whistle through “de facto gag clauses”
that seem directly aimed at undermining new whistleblowing
incentives built into the Dodd-Frank Act.55 For example, Dodd-Frank
expressly permits whistleblowers to report misconduct to the SEC
anonymously.56 Despite that statutory mandate, employers use
provisions in agreements that require employees to notify the
employer anytime the employee discloses information to a
government agency.57
Employers use another provision that permits an employee to
report misconduct to the government but that also waives the

52. See Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National
Security Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 75–80 (2012).
53. See, e.g., THE ECONOMIST, supra note 50 (noting that confidentiality agreements
are “another disincentive” to whistleblowing and citing the results of a survey indicating
that one-fifth of respondents “felt their employer’s confidentiality policies obstructed the
reporting of potentially illegal activity to law enforcers”).
54. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (holding that private
contracts may be unenforceable when public policy considerations outweigh any interests
that would support enforcement); Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and
Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 294–95 (1998); Stephen Gillers, Speak No
Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) (arguing that a contract that conceals a crime may
constitute the crimes of “compounding” or obstruction of justice).
55. See Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 88.
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2), (h)(2) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7, -9(c) (2017).
57. See Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 88.
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employee’s ability to collect an award for such reporting.58 This type
of provision would also undermine Dodd-Frank by waiving the
employee’s right to collect a bounty under the statute’s unique reward
provision.59
Employers often put non-disparagement provisions in
agreements with their employees.60 When these provisions include
specific bars on negative communications to government agencies,
however, such provisions appear to be aimed at reducing the ability of
an employee to blow the whistle because those sorts of
communications would be inherently disparaging. When such
agreements include unusually large liquidated damages provisions,
employees will be even less willing to report misconduct.61
Even
widely
utilized
and
relatively
uncontroversial
confidentiality provisions can undermine whistleblowing if employers
enforce them aggressively. For example, employers have brought
breach of contract claims based on broad confidentiality agreements
against whistleblowers who have used confidential information as
part of their disclosure to the government.62 This tactic has been used
in the False Claims Act context for years, and courts have had
difficulty discerning the circumstances when a whistleblower should
or should not use confidential information to disclose misconduct
publicly.63
Similarly, employers have objected to whistleblowers using
confidential information to support their claims of retaliation.
However, in the Sarbanes-Oxley context at least, courts have found
that the federal interest in whistleblowing can outweigh an employer’s
otherwise legitimate interest in maintaining confidentiality. One court
noted that Sarbanes-Oxley “demonstrates the public policy in favor of
allowing even current employees to assist in securities fraud
investigations. It certainly does not establish a public policy in favor
of allowing employers to muzzle their employees with overbroad
58. See id.
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b); supra text accompanying notes 35–39.
60. See, e.g., NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658 at *2
(Dec. 19, 2016) (noting the company’s severance agreement contained a nondisparagement clause stating that the employee could not engage in communication with
the SEC or other regulators “that disparages, denigrates, maligns or impugns” the
company).
61. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78957, 2016
WL 5404890 at *5 (Sept. 28, 2016) (noting that company’s separation agreement with
employee contained a confidentiality provision with a $250,000 liquidated damages
provision if the employee violated the provision).
62. See Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 108.
63. See id. at 108–16.
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confidentiality agreements.”64 In 2014, two co-authors and I surveyed
the landscape of False Claims Act and Sarbanes-Oxley cases dealing
with confidentiality agreements and whistleblowing and concluded:
A rule that allows whistleblowers to provide the SEC with
documents relevant to understanding and investigating a
possible securities violation strikes an appropriate balance
between employers’ legitimate interests in confidentiality and
data security, while ensuring that the SEC retains access to
potentially valuable sources of evidence and supporting
background information. While employers and employees may
disagree about whether certain documents are relevant to a
possible securities violation, this rule also has the benefit of
being relatively easy to understand and intuitive, reducing the
risk that whistleblowers will inadvertently expose themselves to
personal liability while making a good-faith effort to report
possible misconduct.65
Recently, the Southern District of California relied on this
standard when it resolved litigation over the extent to which an
employee could rely on confidential information to support his claim
of retaliation. In Erhart v. BofI Holding, Inc.,66 Erhart was an internal
auditor of BofI Holding, Inc.67 Erhart signed a confidentiality
agreement when his employment started.68 In the course of his job,
Erhart found conduct he believed violated securities laws and,
concerned that documents about the misconduct were going to be
destroyed, Erhart emailed the confidential documents to his mother
to preserve them.69 After Erhart sued BofI for retaliation, BofI filed
counterclaims alleging that Erhart violated the confidentiality
agreement.70
Erhart defended against the breach of contract claims by
asserting that his release of confidential information was for the
limited purpose of whistleblowing, so it was protected conduct under
numerous whistleblower provisions (including Sarbanes-Oxley) and,
therefore, enforcing the confidentiality agreement would be against
public policy supporting whistleblowing.71 Although the court found

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
See Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 116.
No. 15-cv-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017).
See id. at *2.
See id. at *3.
See id. at *5.
See id. at *3.
See id. at *9–10.
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important interests favored enforcing the agreement,72 it ultimately
determined that the public policy in favor of whistleblowing
outweighed those interests.73 The court focused on “the nexus
between the confidential documents in question and the misconduct
alleged by the whistleblower,”74 thereby adopting the “nuanced”
approach for which my co-authors and I advocated in 2014.75
Ultimately, the court determined that Erhart had reasonably chosen
only documents directly related to the wrongdoing he observed and
that he had only emailed them to protect them from destruction.76
Accordingly, Erhart could use his whistleblowing to defend against
the claim he breached his confidentiality agreement.77
In all, some employers use specific agreements that appear to
limit whistleblowing and some employers utilize broader
confidentiality agreements in litigation to silence whistleblowers who
bring retaliation claims. Anecdotal examples of each of these
provisions exist.78 However, is this practice prevalent in corporate
America? This is a difficult question because, on the whole,
researchers know very little about the content of the vast majority of
confidentiality provisions used by corporations. When corporations
put such provisions in employment agreements, severance
agreements, or settlement agreements, it is often part of the
agreement to keep the agreement itself confidential, in addition to the
substantive information at the core of the agreement.79
Confidentiality provisions only rarely become publicly available for
inspection.
However, they do surface, and the next Section describes an
empirical study of confidentiality provisions that can help shed light
on common corporate practices.

72. See id. at *8–9 (noting that legitimate interests in favor of enforcement include the
“freedom of private parties to contract,” the “legal protection of trade secrets,”
“protecting nonpublic personal information,” and “protecting confidential business
information that may not qualify for trade secret protection”).
73. See id. at *17–18.
74. See id. at *12 (quoting Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 110) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
75. See id. (quoting Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 110).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See supra notes 55–75 and accompanying text.
79. See infra Table 1 (finding that 81.7% of settlement agreements in a study of
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower retaliation cases contained such a confidentiality
provision).
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Results from Broad Study of Settlement Agreements

Recently, I have been able to empirically examine the contents
of 290 settlement agreements from Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
cases. This examination found unsurprising evidence that broad
confidentiality agreements are commonplace. Additionally, it
revealed that specific and problematic provisions exist in a nontrivial
way. Finally, the study confirmed that, when required by the
government, settlement agreements often contain “carve-out”
provisions indicating that employees retain certain whistleblower
rights, even if a specific provision appearing to limit those rights exists
elsewhere in the agreement.
1. Brief Background on the Study
Beginning in 2006, I submitted numerous Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests to OSHA and the Office of
Administrative Law Judges (“OALJ”) requesting documents related
to settlements of Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation cases. To claim
retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley, whistleblowers must first file a
complaint with OSHA, which will then investigate the complaint.80
After OSHA issues a finding, either party may appeal to the OALJ,
which will conduct a full hearing on the allegation.81 Of course, at any
point in the process, the parties may settle the case.82
Interestingly for the study, OSHA and OALJ retain copies of
settlement agreements in cases filed with the agencies because the
Department of Labor’s Sarbanes-Oxley regulations require parties to
submit settlement agreements to the agencies for approval.83 Parties
to a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower dispute must disclose any
settlement agreement, including its financial terms, to OSHA or
OALJ, depending on when the settlement is made in the complaint
process.84 In these instances, the agency is required to find that the
settlement agreement is “fair, adequate, reasonable, and consistent
with the purpose and intent of the relevant whistleblower statute in
the public interest.”85 A withdrawal of a complaint because of a

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104 (2017).
See §§ 1980.105–.106.
See Moberly, supra note 9, at 96–98 (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley settlements).
See § 1980.111(d)(2).
See id.
SAFETY
&
HEALTH
ADMIN.,
WHISTLEBLOWER
OCCUPATIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 6-10 (2011) [hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS
MANUAL 2011]. Prior to 2011, OSHA’s standard for approving settlement agreements was
that it should “provide fair and equitable relief for the complainant.” OCCUPATIONAL
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settlement is only effective if the settlement is approved by the
agency.86
I spent eight years attempting to obtain these settlement
agreements from my initial FOIA requests to both agencies, which
included appeals all the way up to the Department of Labor’s solicitor
general’s office and then ultimately a negotiated resolution to receive
copies of agreements from Sarbanes-Oxley’s effective date until 2013.
It was not until over a year later that I received all of the agreements
from the agencies. Even then, the Department of Labor redacted the
amounts of the settlements and the names of the parties from some of
the agreements. However, the confidentiality provisions were left
untouched and, ultimately, the study analyzed a total of 290
settlement agreements, 173 of which were settled at the OSHA stage
and 117 that were settled while in front of the OALJ.87
To analyze the agreements, I created a code book that defined
the provisions I was interested in examining. Two law student
research assistants then coded the 290 agreements to determine
whether an agreement included any of the provisions. I then coded
the agreements on my own to confirm their coding and correct any
mistakes. Further, editors at the North Carolina Law Review did one
final review of the accuracy of the coding.
2. The Prevalence of Confidentiality Provisions
Table 1 contains the percentage of the 290 settlement
agreements which include provisions that could potentially impede an
employee from blowing the whistle to a government agency. These
provisions are explained in more detail below.

SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 6-1 (2003)
[hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 2003].
86. See § 1980.111(c).
87. I originally received 182 OSHA agreements and 123 OALJ agreements. However,
nine OSHA agreements and six OALJ agreements were not usable because they were
incomplete in some way, such as pages that were missing or not included in the file sent by
the agency. OSHA gives statistics on the outcomes of its cases. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMIN., THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS: STATISTICS,
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/3DCharts-FY2006-FY2016.pdf. [https://perma.cc/FAY59JR6]. From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2014, OSHA states that 356 SarbanesOxley cases settled. See id. It is impossible to directly compare my data with OSHA
statistics because I relied on calendar year information and not the fiscal year, and the
dates do not exactly overlap. That said, it is interesting to note that I examined 115
agreements from OSHA dated from 2006–2013, which would be 32.3% of the OSHA
claims that were settled from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2014. The OALJ does not
publish the number of cases settled while pending review at the OALJ level.
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Type of Provision
Confidentiality Provision: employee is restricted from
disclosure of terms of settlement and underlying facts
Non-Disparagement Provision: employee is restricted
from making negative statements about employer
Non-Disclosure Provision: employee is prohibited
from disclosure except as required by law or subpoena
Waiver Provision: employee waives any future award
or recovery
Provision Related to Anonymity: employee must
inform employer whether employee has filed any other
claim or disclosed information to the government prior to
execution of agreement
Carve-out Provision: permits employee to participate
in a government investigation
Trade Secrets Provision: employee is required to
maintain confidentiality of employer’s trade secrets
Subpoena Disclosure Provision: employee must
inform employer if employee receives a subpoena to
disclose information
Provision Related to Participation in Government
Investigation: employee is prohibited from participating in
a government investigation, except as required by law or
subpoena
Carve-out Provision: permits employee to report
misconduct to the government
Government Disclosure Provision: employee must
inform employer if employee discloses information to the
government after the execution of the agreement

767

Percentage of
Agreements
81.7
64.1
60.0
43.8
42.4

41.7
35.5
32.8

22.4

22.4
2.1

Table 1
Broad Confidentiality Provisions: Most of the agreements
(81.7%) contained a broad confidentiality provision that required the
employees to keep the facts of the case and the terms of the
settlement confidential. Substantially fewer (35.5%) contained
provisions specifically related to trade secrets or confidential
information. Interestingly, over half (60.0%) limited employees from
disclosing anything about the settlement or the underlying facts of the
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case unless the employee was required by law to disclose, such as by a
subpoena. In other words, the message is clear: employees may not
disclose information voluntarily to the government. The only
disclosure permitted is when one is forced by law to disclose. Indeed,
71.7% of the agreements that had a broad confidentiality provision
also specifically limited any disclosure to those required by law, such
as in response to a subpoena. Similarly, another type of provision
purports to prohibit an employee from voluntarily participating in a
government investigation; 22.4% of agreements contained that
provision.
Provisions Related to Anonymity: Another potentially
problematic provision requires the employee to inform the employer
if the employee has filed any other claim or if the employee has
already disclosed any information to the government. Almost half
(42.4%) of the agreements contained this type of provision. Another
provision that has caused some concern would require an employee
to affirmatively inform the employer if the employee discloses any
information to the government going forward. These types of
provisions would clearly undermine the anonymity protection of
Dodd-Frank.88
A very small percentage of agreements (2.1%) contained a
provision which would require the employee to inform the employer
if the employee discloses information to the government. Even more
encouragingly, only one of the ninety-three agreements dated from
2010 to 2013 contained that sort of provision.89 The 2010 date is
important because, of course, that is the year Dodd-Frank was
enacted and the anonymity guarantee was added to federal securities
whistleblower law. That said, 32.8% of the agreements did require the
employee to inform the employer if the employee received a
subpoena to disclose any information related to the settlement or the
underlying facts. Interestingly, after 2010, a significantly higher
percentage of agreements contained this provision than prior to
2010.90
Waivers of Rewards: Another problematic provision requires
employees to waive any future award or recovery should the
government further investigate their complaint. This provision would
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2), (h)(2) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7, -9(c); Moberly
et al., supra note 48, at 98–102.
89. The dates of fifty-one of the 290 agreements were not identifiable.
90. Before 2010, 30.1% of the agreements required employees to inform the employer
if they received a subpoena. From 2010–2013, 46.2% of the agreements had that provision.
This difference is significant, with an alpha score (p-value) of .008.
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undermine the Dodd-Frank “bounty” model and discourage future
reporting.91 A large portion of the agreements (43.8%) contained this
provision. Of the ninety-three agreements dated from 2010 to 2013,
over half (55.9%) contained a waiver provision. Interestingly, this is a
slight increase from the 43.8% of agreements dated prior to 2010 that
contained a waiver provision.92 One conclusion from this difference
may be that some employers responded to Dodd-Frank by attempting
to have employees affirmatively waive their ability to receive the new
bounties; however, the difference is not statistically significant.93
Non-Disparagement: A final potentially problematic provision
could be an overly broad non-disparagement clause. Of the 290
agreements collected, the study found that 64.1% contained nondisparagement provisions. However, the original coding I completed
did not evaluate the breadth of those provisions and whether they
explicitly prohibited disparaging statements to the government.
Carve-Out Provisions: Lastly, it should be noted that some
agreements did contain an explicit “carve-out” provision, which
attempted to inform the employee that, notwithstanding any other
provision in the agreement, the employee was permitted either to
disclose information to the government (22.4%) or to participate in a
government investigation (41.7%).
In sum, both anecdotal and empirical evidence demonstrate that
employers use various confidentiality provisions in employment,
severance, and settlement agreements. These provisions may serve
legitimate employer interests, but they also may be used to
undermine an employee’s willingness to blow the whistle, depending
upon how they are framed, interpreted, and enforced.
III. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMOVES
Within the last few years, the federal government has begun
examining such provisions to determine whether they inappropriately
discourage whistleblowing even if they might serve some legitimate
employer interest in confidentiality. This Part identifies three
different federal government efforts to dissuade corporations from
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b); Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 102–08.
92. It is an odd coincidence that the total percentage of agreements with the waiver
matches the percentage of agreements before 2010 that had the waiver provision. Both
percentages equal 43.8%, even though the percentage of agreements post-2010 with the
provision equals 55.9%. This is explained by the fact that fifty-one agreements were not
dated, and eleven of those non-dated agreements contained the waiver.
93. The difference between agreements from before 2010 and from 2010–2013 has an
alpha score (p-value) of .0685.
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discouraging whistleblowing through confidentiality provisions. These
programs are interesting for two reasons. First, collectively they signal
the important role whistleblowers play in the federal government’s
law enforcement program. Second, they provide further evidence of
the creative ways companies attempt to enforce confidentiality norms
and, perhaps, circumvent the government’s efforts to encourage more
whistleblowing. Ultimately, these actions demonstrate that the federal
government will not allow companies to undermine its efforts to
promote whistleblowing, and it will monitor companies’ agreements
to catch and stop new derivations of improper confidentiality
provisions.
A. SEC Rule 21F-17
After the Dodd-Frank Act created the SEC’s Whistleblower
Program discussed above,94 the SEC promulgated regulations to
implement it.95 One of those regulations, Rule 21F-17, expressly
prohibited employers from interfering with the whistleblower
programs enacted under Dodd-Frank, stating “[n]o person may take
any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with
the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation,
including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality
agreement . . . with respect to such communications.”96 The regulation
sat dormant, with little public attention, from its enactment in 2011
until 2014. At that point, the head of the SEC’s Office of the
Whistleblower, Sean McKessy, began making public statements about
the importance of the provision and he warned companies that the
SEC would take seriously the prohibition on overly broad
confidentiality agreements that impeded whistleblowing.97 He noted
that the SEC was “actively looking for examples of confidentiality
agreements, separat[ion] agreements, employee agreements that . . .
in substance say ‘as a prerequisite to get this benefit you agree you’re
not going to come to the Commission or you’re not going to report
anything to a regulator.’”98 McKessy further cautioned that “if we find
that kind of language, not only are we going to go to the companies,
94. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
95. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 101 SEC Docket 630 (Aug.
12, 2011).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(A) (2017).
97. Brian Mahoney, SEC Warns In-House Attys Against Whistleblower Contracts,
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/518815/sec-warns-in-house-attysagainst-whistleblower-contracts [https://perma.cc/K7BJ-46QY].
98. Id.
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we are going to go after the lawyers who drafted it,” possibly by
revoking those attorneys’ right to practice before the Commission.99
In January of the following year, Mary Jo White, the Chairman
of the SEC, wrote U.S. Representative Maxine Waters to say that she
was worried about agreements that impede whistleblowers from
coming forward.100 Then, a month later, the Wall Street Journal
reported that the SEC sent letters to a number of companies asking
for “every nondisclosure agreement, confidentiality agreement,
severance agreement and settlement agreement they entered into
with employees since Dodd-Frank went into effect, as well as
documents related to corporate training on confidentiality[,] . . . ‘all
documents that refer or relate to whistleblowing’ and a list of
terminated employees.”101
Shortly thereafter, in April 2015, the SEC announced a
settlement with KBR, Inc., in which KBR agreed to stop including
certain language in the confidentiality agreements it used when it
internally investigated claims of misconduct.102 Employees
interviewed as witnesses for an internal KBR investigation were
required to sign an agreement not to discuss the interview “and the
subject matter discussed during the interview” without receiving
permission from the company.103 If the witness violated the
nondisclosure agreement, the person was subject to discipline and
possible termination of employment.104 Although the SEC
acknowledged it was unaware of any attempts by KBR to enforce the
provision, the SEC determined that it undermined the purpose of
Rule 21F-17 and sufficiently impeded employees from reporting
misconduct to the SEC.105
As part of the settlement, KBR agreed to contact employees who
signed the agreement to tell them that that they did not need to seek
permission from KBR before communicating with the government
about illegal conduct.106 Additionally, KBR amended its
confidentiality statement to include this provision:
99. Id.
100. See Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC Probes Companies’ Treatment of Whistleblowers,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-companiestreatment-of-whistleblowers-1424916002 [https://perma.cc/LA94-WJVR (dark archive)].
101. Id.
102. See KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 111 SEC Docket 917, 2015 WL
1456619, at *2 (Apr. 1, 2015).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *3.
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Nothing in this Confidentiality Statement prohibits me
from reporting possible violations of federal law or
regulation to any governmental agency or entity,
including but not limited to the Department of Justice,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Congress, and any agency Inspector General, or
making other disclosures that are protected under the
whistleblower provisions of federal law or regulation. I
do not need the prior authorization of the Law
Department to make any such reports or disclosures
and I am not required to notify the company that I
have made such reports or disclosures.107
KBR also agreed to pay a penalty of $130,000.108
It would take another year before a second enforcement action
was announced. In June 2016, the SEC settled a case against Merrill
Lynch and related companies (collectively, “Merrill Lynch”)
involving a number of securities laws violations.109 As part of the
settlement, the SEC determined that Merrill Lynch used language in
its policies, procedures, and agreements that impeded
communications from its employees to the government about
misconduct.110 For example, the SEC took issue with two aspects of
Merrill Lynch’s form severance agreements that contained typical
promises not to reveal confidential information or trade secrets
without legal process or written approval from the company. First,
although the agreement expressly permitted the employee to reveal
information pursuant to a court order or other legal requirement, the
language “did not permit the employee to voluntarily disclose
confidential information to [the government].”111 Second, in addition
to the form severance agreement made after 2014, Merrill Lynch
advised departing employees that they were permitted to initiate
communications directly with the SEC, but the type of information
they could communicate was limited to “information relating to the

107. Id. at *2.
108. See id.
109. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
78141, 2016 WL 4363431, at *1 (June 23, 2016).
110. See id. at *19.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
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severance agreement itself or ‘its underlying facts and
circumstances.’”112
Even though the SEC was, once again, unaware of any times that
Merrill Lynch actually attempted to enforce these provisions, the
SEC determined that such provisions violated Rule 21F-17 because
the company “operated to impede such communications by
prohibiting employees from voluntarily providing information to the
Commission without prior approval from” Merrill Lynch.113 The
company agreed to change the language, and the SEC approved a
substitution, stating that
with the exception of information that is protected from
disclosure by any applicable law or privilege, nothing in the
agreement prohibits or limits the employee or his counsel from
initiating communications directly with, responding to any
inquiry from, volunteering information to, or providing
testimony before, among others, the Commission in connection
with any reporting of, investigation into, or proceeding
regarding suspected violations of law. The language also makes
clear that the employee is not required to advise or seek
permission from any of the [Corporate] Entities before
engaging in any such activity.114
Additionally, Merrill Lynch began providing all employees with
mandatory annual training that includes a written “21F-17 Notice,”
setting forth the employee’s rights to
(i) report potential violations of law to the Commission or other
government or self-regulatory authorities without permission
from or notice to his or her employer, (ii) report possible
violations anonymously and to provide disclosures that are
protected or required under whistleblower laws, and (iii)
cooperate voluntarily with or respond to any inquiry from the
Commission or other federal or state agencies or self-regulatory
organizations. The 21F-17 Notice also summarizes several of
the rights the employee possesses under the Commission’s
Whistleblower Program and states that employees have the
right to not be retaliated against for reporting possible
securities law violations.115

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *20.
Id.
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Finally, Merrill Lynch updated its Code of Conduct and other
agreements, policies, and procedures to make clear that employees
are not restricted from exercising their rights under Rule 21F-17.116
Shortly thereafter the floodgates opened. From August 2016 to
January 2017, the SEC announced seven more settlements involving
Rule 21F-17.
BlueLinx Holdings—August 10, 2016: The SEC found provisions
in BlueLinx’s severance agreements that were similar to those it
found violated Rule 21F-17 in Merrill Lynch—the employee agreed
to hold information confidential except as required by law or after
informing the company.117 No exception was made for disclosing
information about illegality to the government or the SEC.118
Unsurprisingly, the SEC found that this language violated Rule 21F17.119
Importantly, the BlueLinx enforcement action also condemned a
provision in which an employee was required to waive any monetary
recovery that might be connected to an employee complaint to an
administrative agency.120 This provision also violated Rule 21F-17
because it “removed the critically important financial incentives that
are intended to encourage persons to communicate directly with the
Commission staff about possible securities law violations.”121
As a result of the enforcement action, the SEC required
BlueLinx to include a statement acknowledging that nothing in the
agreement limited the employee’s right to file a charge or complaint
with the government, to communicate with the government, to
participate in any investigation or proceeding conducted by the
government, to provide documents to the government, nor to receive
an award for providing information to the government.122
Additionally, BlueLinx agreed to pay a $265,000 penalty.123
Health Net, Inc.—August 16, 2016: In its case against Health Net,
the SEC continued to focus on the ability of an employee to receive a
whistleblower award. After Rule 21F-17 was promulgated in 2011,
Health Net prohibited an employee who signed a severance
agreement with the company from filing an application for, or
116. Id. at *21.
117. See BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78528, 2016 WL 4363864,
at *3 (Aug. 10, 2016).
118. See id.
119. See id. at *4–5.
120. See id. at *4.
121. Id.
122. See id. at *5.
123. See id. at *6.
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accepting, a whistleblower award from the SEC.124 The SEC again
noted that such a provision undermines the purpose of the DoddFrank whistleblower program, which is to encourage persons to
communicate directly with the SEC regarding securities law
violations.125 Accordingly, Health Net agreed to remove the provision,
contact the employees who signed the agreement to inform them that
the provision was unenforceable, and pay a $340,000 penalty.126
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV—September 28, 2016: While the
BlueLinx and Health Net consent orders focused entirely on
agreements that violated Rule 21F-17, the consent order in AnheuserBusch was similar to the Merrill Lynch order in that the SEC came
across a Rule 21F-17 violation while it was investigating other
violations.127 In Anheuser-Busch, the SEC was investigating
allegations that the company had violated accounting procedures and
internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977.128 An employee began giving information to the SEC as part of
the investigation, was later discharged, and then entered into a
separation agreement that contained general confidentiality
provisions prohibiting the employee from disclosing confidential and
proprietary information as well as information regarding the
substance of the agreement.129 These restrictions might have been
acceptable by themselves; however, the agreement also contained a
substantial liquidated damages provision that required a $250,000
payment if the employee violated the confidentiality provisions.130
After signing the agreement, the employee refused to cooperate with
the SEC any further out of fear that further cooperation would trigger
the liquidated damages provision.131
The SEC found that these provisions together violated Rule 21F17.132 However, the ruling was limited to that single employee’s
agreement because in 2015, Anheuser-Busch amended its form
separation agreement to include language clarifying that employees

124. See Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78590, 2016 WL 4474755, at *3
(Aug. 16, 2016).
125. Id. at *4.
126. Id.
127. See Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78957, 2016 WL
5404890, at *2 (Sept. 28, 2016).
128. Id.
129. Id. at *6.
130. See id. at *6–7.
131. Id. at *7.
132. See id. at *9.
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can report possible illegalities to government agencies.133 The SEC
did not take issue with the new language added to the provision,
which stated, “I understand and acknowledge that notwithstanding
any other provision in this Agreement, I am not prohibited or in any
way restricted from reporting possible violations of law to a
governmental agency or entity, and I am not required to inform the
Company if I make such reports.”134
NeuStar, Inc.—December 19, 2016: The SEC found that NeuStar
violated Rule 21F-17 by including a broad non-disparagement clause
in its severance agreements.135 The clause prohibited employees from
engaging in communication “that disparages, denigrates, maligns or
impugns NeuStar” with the SEC as an entity, along with “regulators”
more generally.136 An employee who violated the clause agreed to
forfeit all but $100 of any severance compensation.137
After the SEC began investigating, NeuStar altered its
agreements to include a proviso allowing for communication,
“without notice to or approval by NeuStar, with any federal
government agency about a potential violation of a federal law or
regulation.”138 The SEC appeared to accept that change and then also
fined NeuStar $180,000.139
SandRidge Energy, Inc.—December 20, 2016: SandRidge entered
into separation agreements with employees who left the company that
prohibited voluntary, direct communication with the SEC.140 The
agreements also contained a provision prohibiting the disclosure of
confidential information to “any government agency” without the
company’s prior written consent.141 Finally, the agreement prohibited
making disparaging remarks about the company to a variety of people
and entities, including “to any governmental or regulatory agency.”142
Interestingly, SandRidge would modify the language when
specifically requested by an employee, but left in the language when
an employee did not identify the provision as problematic.143
133. Id. at *8.
134. Id.
135. See NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658, at *2–3
(Dec. 19, 2016).
136. See id. at *2.
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id. at *3.
139. See id.
140. SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79607, 2016 WL 7368270, at
*2 (Dec. 20, 2016).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *3.
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In prior consent orders, the SEC often noted how many
employees had signed improper agreements since the enactment of
the regulation on August 12, 2011.144 In the SandRidge agreement, for
the first time the SEC noted the number of employees who had
signed such an agreement since the KBR consent order on April 1,
2015.145 The order also noted that SandRidge’s in-house counsel
“received multiple client alerts and other information about the
[KBR] enforcement matter,” clearly indicating that companies should
have taken notice of the SEC’s enforcement actions related to Rule
21F-17 and altered their practices accordingly.146
The SEC was also troubled that the agreements were signed
while the company was under investigation. The Order noted the
potential for SandRidge officers and employees to communicate with
the SEC was “not merely a hypothetical concern” for SandRidge
because of this context.147 To remediate the problem after the SEC
noted the likely violation, SandRidge removed the references to
government agencies in its confidentiality and defamation clauses and
added a new provision specifically excepting contact with the
government to report illegality from any prohibition contained in the
agreement.148 The SEC imposed a $1.4 million penalty.149
BlackRock, Inc.—January 17, 2017: Shortly after Rule 21F-17
was promulgated, BlackRock revised its form separation agreement
to add a provision requiring a departing employee to waive the ability
to recover an award for reporting misconduct pursuant to DoddFrank, among other statutes.150 Then, over four-and-a-half years later,
on March 31, 2016, BlackRock revised the agreement again to
remove the waiver provision.151 The company now also provides all
employees with mandatory annual training regarding employees’
144. See, e.g., NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658, at *2
(Dec. 19, 2016); Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78590, 2016 WL 4474755, at
*3 (Aug. 16, 2016).
145. See SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at *3.
146. Id.
147. See id. at *4.
148. Id. at *5–6.
149. Id. at *7. The SEC also found a violation of Dodd-Frank’s prohibition on
retaliation against whistleblowers, which likely played a role in the size of the penalty. See
id. at *5–7. The $1.4 million penalty is subject to SandRidge’s bankruptcy plan, which may
discount the payment to approximately $100,000. See Andrew Ackerman, Regulators Rap
Firms Using Severance to Silence Whistleblowers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-rap-firms-using-severance-to-silence-whistleblowers1482267305 [https://perma.cc/B2MJ-9FAT].
150. BlackRock, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79804, 2017 WL 164091, at *9 (Jan.
17, 2017).
151. See id. at *3.
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rights to report misconduct to the government, to do so anonymously,
and to not be retaliated against if they do report.152 Nevertheless,
because of the violations that occurred between 2011 and 2016, the
SEC fined BlackRock $340,000.153
HomeStreet, Inc.—January 19, 2017: The SEC investigated
HomeStreet because of alleged accounting control violations related
to commercial loans, among other things.154 As part of that
investigation, the SEC learned that HomeStreet’s severance
agreements contained a waiver of potential awards if the employee
filed a charge or communicated with any government agency.155 The
interesting difference between HomeStreet’s award-waiver provision
and BlackRock’s provision is that BlackRock specifically identified
potential whistleblower awards under Dodd-Frank, while
HomeStreet actually referenced the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), indicating that its intent was for something
entirely different than the Dodd-Frank reward program.156 Before
Dodd-Frank, such waiver clauses were relatively common and were
included to ensure an employee did not receive a “double-recovery”
by settling an EEOC claim with the company and then reporting it to
the EEOC and recovering again if the EEOC settled a pattern and
practice claim.157 Courts have routinely indicated such a waiver
provision was permissible.158 However, the SEC asserted in the
HomeStreet order that such provisions undermined Dodd-Frank’s
incentive program, and therefore violated Rule 21F-17.159 As a result,
HomeStreet revised its standard severance agreement to include a
series of statements reaffirming an employee’s right to report
misconduct to the government and to recover an award for
information provided to the government.160 The SEC also fined
HomeStreet $500,000.161

152. See id. at *4.
153. See id. at *10.
154. HomeStreet, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79844, 2017 WL 218847, at *1–2
(Jan. 19, 2017).
155. See id. at *2, *8.
156. Id. at *9.
157. Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 103–04.
158. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L’Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1987) (“[A]lthough an employee cannot waive the right to file a charge with the
EEOC, the employee can waive not only the right to recover in his or her own lawsuit but
also the right to recover in a suit brought by the EEOC on the employee’s behalf.”);
EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987).
159. See HomeStreet, 2017 WL 218847, at *9.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *11.
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Thus, after two years and over $3 million in SEC fines, what do
we know about the scope of Rule 21F-17? Examining these
enforcement actions and consent orders collectively reveals a number
of important lessons.
First, the SEC believes that agreements limiting communication
with government agencies, such as the SEC, violate Rule 21F-17. One
clearly unacceptable limitation is a requirement that an employee
must notify the company before disclosing information to a
government agency.162 This notification undermines Dodd-Frank’s
guarantee of anonymity to whistleblowers. Moreover, language in an
agreement permitting disclosure to the government only if legally
required or if compelled by a subpoena is not sufficient.163 The
language of a confidentiality agreement must also state that the
employee may voluntarily disclose illegal conduct to the
government.164
Second, the SEC considers overly broad non-disparagement
clauses to potentially violate Rule 21F-17 just as much as overly broad
confidentiality agreements. Specifically, the SEC would frown upon
companies equating whistleblowing with disparagement because
reporting wrongdoing would reflect negatively on the company.165
Third, broad confidentiality and disclosure provisions are not
acceptable if they contain significant liquidated damages provisions.
In Anheuser Busch, the penalty for violating the confidentiality
provisions was $250,000.166 In NeuStar, violating the broad nondisparagement clause could have led to forfeiting all but $100 of any
severance compensation.167 The SEC found that both provisions
violated Rule 21F-17.
Fourth, despite the aforementioned lessons, the SEC will accept
broad confidentiality language as long as the company also includes a
162. See SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79607, 2016 WL 7368270,
at *4 (Dec. 20, 2016); KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 111 SEC Docket 917,
2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015).
163. See, e.g., SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at *4; BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 78528, 2016 WL 4363984, at *2 (Aug. 10, 2016); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78141, 2016 WL 4363431, at *17 (June
23, 2016).
164. See SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at *2; BlueLinx, 2016 WL 4363984, at *2–3
(noting that no exception was made for disclosing to the government); Merrill Lynch, 2016
WL 4363431, at *17.
165. See SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at*2.
166. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78957, 2016 WL
5404890, at *5 (Sept. 28, 2016).
167. See NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658, at *2 (Dec.
19, 2016).
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carve-out provision explicitly noting that the employee may contact a
government agency with information about violations of federal
law.168 Moreover, several companies began annual training sessions
for its employees to inform them of their rights to disclose
information to the government.169 They also amended their Codes of
Conduct and other policies to consistently send this same message.170
Fifth, a company may not require an employee to waive a reward
for blowing the whistle. The SEC first made this clear in BlueLinx,171
and then found violations in several other cases involving such
waivers.172 This likely applies to agreements with such waivers even if
they are holdovers from a pre-Dodd Frank time when such waivers
applied primarily to EEOC complaints.173
Sixth, the SEC will find a violation based solely on the language
of a provision, even if there is not any evidence that the provision
actually dissuaded employees from communicating with the
government. Admittedly, this would be a very difficult point to prove
(although the SEC in at least three consent orders identified such an
employee174); nevertheless, it is notable how many of the Rule 21F-17
consent orders with significant penalties indicate that no concrete
“harm” could be found.175
Seventh, the SEC will examine severance and separation
agreements as part of its regular course of investigating other
potential violations. The enforcement actions against Merrill Lynch,
Anheuser-Busch, SandRidge, and HomeStreet all involved learning
of the Rule 21F-17 violations by investigating violations of other
securities laws. Additionally, in SandRidge and HomeStreet, the SEC
168. See, e.g., HomeStreet, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79844, 2017 WL 218847, at
*9 (Jan. 19, 2017); SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at *4; NeuStar, 2016 WL 7335658, at *3;
Anheuser-Busch, 2016 WL 5404890, at *7; Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
78590, 2016 WL 4474755, at *3 (Aug. 16, 2016); BlueLinx, 2016 WL 4363984, at *4; Merrill
Lynch, 2016 WL 4363431, at *18.
169. See, e.g., BlackRock, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79804, 2017 WL 164091, at
*3 (Jan. 17, 2017); Merrill Lynch, 2016 WL 4363431, at *18.
170. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 2016 WL 4363431, at *18.
171. See BlueLinx, 2016 WL 4363984, at *4.
172. See BlackRock, 2017 WL 164091, at *2; HomeStreet, 2017 WL 218847, at *9.
173. See HomeStreet, 2017 WL 218847, at *9.
174. See SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79607, 2016 WL 7368270,
at *5 (Dec. 20, 2016); NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658,
at *2 (Dec. 19, 2016); Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78957,
2016 WL 5404890, at *6 (Sept. 28, 2016).
175. See, e.g., HomeStreet, 2017 WL 218847, at *9; Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 78590, 2016 WL 4474755, at *3 (Aug. 16, 2016); Merrill Lynch, 2016 WL
4363431, at *17; KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 111 SEC Docket 917, 2015
WL 1456619, at *2 (Apr. 1, 2015).
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found that the companies were actively impeding whistleblowers in
more ways than simply using overly broad agreements. In SandRidge,
the SEC found that the company retaliated against a whistleblower176
and in HomeStreet, the SEC determined that the company attempted
to identify an internal whistleblower and threatened not to advance
costs under an indemnification agreement to a suspected
whistleblower.177
Finally, the SEC clearly expects companies to have received the
message that these provisions potentially violate Rule 21F-17.178
Although it may not ameliorate past violations (at least since the Rule
was promulgated on August 12, 2011), changing form agreements
now might still bring leniency in later enforcement actions.
Indeed, to ensure that the message is clear, on October 24, 2016,
the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (part of the
SEC) issued a Risk Alert to highlight these enforcement actions and
to inform issuers of securities that the compliance office is examining
“compliance manuals, codes of ethics, employment agreements,
severance agreements, and other documents” to evaluate whether
they may contain provisions that undermine Rule 21F-17.179
Moreover, in December 2016, the new Chief of the SEC’s Office of
Whistleblower told the Wall Street Journal that Rule 21F-17 “is going
to remain a focus for my office in 2017 and I expect you will see
additional cases brought under this authority.”180
B.

OSHA Guidance

OSHA also attempted to limit the ability of confidentiality
agreements to undermine whistleblowing. As noted above, under
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Department of Labor must review all settlement
agreements of whistleblower retaliation claims to ensure that they are
“fair, adequate, and reasonable, and consistent with the purpose and
intent of the relevant whistleblower statute in the public interest.”181

176. See SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at *5–6.
177. See HomeStreet, 2017 WL 218847, at *7–9.
178. See SandRidge, 2016 WL 7368270, at *3 (noting how many employees had signed
settlement agreements that violated the Rule since April 1, 2015, the date the first Rule
21F-17 enforcement action and consent order was made public).
179. Examining Whistleblower Rule Compliance, NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM: RISK
ALERT (Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Sec. Exch. Comm’n,
Washington, D.C.), Oct. 24, 2016, at 3, https://www.sec.gov/files/ocie-2016-risk-alertexamining-whistleblower-rule-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE6M-XW9U].
180. Ackerman, supra note 149.
181. WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 2011, supra note 85, at 6-11. Prior
to 2011, OSHA’s standard for approving settlement agreements was that it should
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Additionally, since 2011, OSHA has declared in its Investigations
Manual that it
will not approve a provision that prohibits, restricts, or
otherwise discourages an employee from participating in
protected activity in the future. Accordingly, although a
complainant may waive the right to recover future or additional
benefits from actions that occurred prior to the date of the
settlement agreement, a complainant cannot waive the right to
file a complaint based either on those actions or on future
actions of the employer. When such a provision is encountered,
the parties should be asked to remove it or to replace it with the
following: “Nothing in this Agreement is intended to or shall
prevent or interfere with Complainant’s nonwaivable right to
engage in any future activities protected under the
whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA.”182
Further, OSHA’s Investigations Manual instructed that
investigators should review Sarbanes-Oxley settlement agreements to
check for “gag” clauses prohibiting the employee’s ability to
participate in investigations or testify in proceedings related to their
employment.183 If such a provision existed,
the parties should be asked to remove it or to replace it with the
following: “Nothing in this Agreement is intended to or must
prevent, impede or interfere with Complainant’s providing
truthful testimony and information in the course of an
investigation or proceeding authorized by law and conducted by
a government agency.”184
There is mixed evidence regarding whether the new OSHA
Investigations Manual has made a difference in the behavior of
parties when they settle Sarbanes-Oxley cases. In the empirical study
detailed above, I examined whether OSHA Sarbanes-Oxley
settlement agreements contained the OSHA-required carve-out
provisions.185 Only 22% of the agreements included OSHA-mandated
language from the Investigations Manual.186 Moreover, of the
agreements put in place in 2011 or after, 40.3% contained the OSHA
carve-out. Interestingly, settlement agreements arising out of the
“provide fair and equitable relief for the complainant.” WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 2003, supra note 85, at 6-1.
182. See WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 2011, supra note 85, at 6-11.
183. See id.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. See supra Section II.B.
186. See supra Section II.B.
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OSHA process are statistically significantly more likely to have the
carve-out provision from the Manual than agreements approved by
the OALJ.187
However, this does not quite tell the whole story. Of the twentytwo agreements from 2011–2013 that had provisions limiting
participation in government investigations to those required by law or
subpoena (i.e., the type of provision that might “prevent, impede or
interfere” with OSHA whistleblowing), 81.8% had a carve-out
provision either identical or similar to the OSHA language. In those
types of agreements prior to 2011, only 33.3% had a carve-out
provision. The increase between the pre- and post-2011 agreements is
statistically significant.188 The difference may have occurred because it
appears that after the Investigations Manual changed either the
Department of Labor began scrutinizing these agreements more
rigorously or employers affirmatively began including such carve-out
provisions in their agreements.189
A similar pattern exists for agreements that contain broad
confidentiality provisions. Agreements dated 2011 or after are far
more likely to have carve-out provisions. Provisions specifically
permitting participating in government investigations appear in
65.1% of the 2011–2013 agreements, but only appear in 36.1% of
agreements before 2011.190 A difference for carve-out provisions
specifically permitting reporting also appears (33.3% have them from
2011–2013, while 24.5% have then before 2011); however, the
difference is not statistically significant.191
Thus, the 2011 Investigations Manual seemed to have limited
impact. However, the meaning of “prevent, impede or interfere”
remained unclear in Sarbanes-Oxley cases settled by OSHA.
Additionally, like the SEC, OSHA continued to encounter provisions
in settlement agreements that “prohibit, restrict, or otherwise
discourage a complainant from participating in protected activity
related to matters that arose during his or her employment.”192

187. The alpha score (p-value) is 0.00000003.
188. The alpha score (p-value) is 0.0004.
189. Interestingly, for agreements with restrictions on reporting, from 2011–2013,
31.9% (fifteen out of forty-seven) also had carve-out provisions similar to that required by
the OSHA Investigations Manual. Before 2011, only 21 (20.0%) of the 105 agreements
contained that carve-out. However, this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.16).
190. This result is significant (p = 0.00009).
191. The alpha score (p-value) is 0.27.
192. Memorandum from MaryAnn Garrahan, Dir., Directorate of Whistleblower Prot.
Programs to the Reg’l Adm’rs & Whistleblower Program Managers 1 (Aug. 23, 2016),
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Accordingly, on August 23, 2016, OSHA issued new policy guidelines
for addressing such provisions.193
In the 2016 policy guidelines, OSHA noted that provisions that
prohibit, restrict, or otherwise discourage a complainant from
engaging in protected activity can arise in a variety of forms, including
broad confidentiality or non-disparagement clauses “that
complainants may interpret as restricting their ability to engage in
protected activity.”194 These broad provisions may be unenforceable
even if they contain the proviso “except as provided by law,” because
employees may not understand their legal rights that are being
excepted from inclusion in the broader provision.195
In addition to broad confidentiality and non-disparagement
provisions, in its guidelines OSHA identified four types of specific
provisions that might impede whistleblowers:
a. A provision that restricts the complainant’s ability to provide
information to the government, participate in investigations, file
a complaint, or testify in proceedings based on a respondent’s
past or future conduct. For example, OSHA will not approve a
provision that restricts a complainant’s right to provide
information to the government related to an occupational
injury or exposure.
b. A provision that requires a complainant to notify his or her
employer before filing a complaint or voluntarily
communicating with the government regarding the employer’s
past or future conduct.
c. A provision that requires a complainant to affirm that he or
she has not previously provided information to the government
or engaged in other protected activity, or to disclaim any
knowledge that the employer has violated the law. Such
requirements may compromise statutory and regulatory
mechanisms for allowing individuals to provide information
confidentially to the government, and thereby discourage
complainants from engaging in protected activity.
d. A provision that requires a complainant to waive his or her
right to receive a monetary award (sometimes referred to in
settlement agreements as a “reward”) from a governmentadministered whistleblower award program for providing
information to a government agency. For example, OSHA will
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/sites/default/files/2017-10/InterimGuidance-DeFactoGag
OrderProvisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD8T-XU8B].
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 3.
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not approve a provision that requires a complainant to waive
his or her right to receive a monetary award from the Securities
and Exchange Commission, under Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act, for providing information to the government
related to a potential violation of securities laws. Such an award
waiver may discourage a complainant from engaging in
protected activity under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as
providing information to the Commission about a possible
securities law violation. For the same reason, OSHA will also
not approve a provision that requires a complainant to remit
any portion of such an award to respondent. For example,
OSHA will not approve a provision that requires a complainant
to transfer award funds to respondent to offset payments made
to the complainant under the settlement agreement.196
Finally, OSHA noted that settlements requiring liquidated
damages when a breach of the agreement occurs might be
unenforceable if the damages amount is “clearly disproportionate to
the anticipated loss to the respondent of a breach.”197
When OSHA comes across such provisions in its review of
whistleblower retaliation settlement agreements, OSHA will now ask
employers to remove offending provisions
and/or add the following language prominently positioned
within the settlement: “Nothing in this Agreement is intended
to or shall prevent, impede or interfere with complainant’s nonwaivable right, without prior notice to Respondent, to provide
information to the government, participate in investigations, file
a complaint, testify in proceedings regarding Respondent’s past
or future conduct, or engage in any future activities protected
under the whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA, or to
receive and fully retain a monetary award from a governmentadministered whistleblower award program for providing
information directly to a government agency.”198
Notably, many of the problematic provisions OSHA identified in
the policy guidelines mirror provisions the SEC found violate Rule
21F-17.199 For example, most obviously, neither entity will tolerate
contractual limitations on the right of an employee to disclose
misconduct to the government. Similarly, both OSHA and the SEC
now find waivers of any whistleblower reward to be problematic.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 3 (emphasis removed).
See supra text accompanying notes 162–78.
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Moreover, provisions that require an employee to notify an employer
when reporting illegality to the government seem unenforceable
because they undermine statutory protections for anonymous and
confidential reporting to the government. Finally, the government
agencies recognize that otherwise acceptable confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions may nevertheless discourage employees
from blowing the whistle, and therefore they will require provisions to
be added to agreements that clarify an employee’s non-negotiable
right to communicate with the government.
C.

Government Contractors

Finally, the federal government is examining the use of
confidentiality agreements by federal contractors that chill
whistleblowing. Specifically, in March 2015, the Office of Inspector
General of the U.S. Department of State (“OIG”) released a report
summarizing its investigation of thirty contractors with the largest
dollar volume of contracts with the State Department.200 The OIG
initiated the inquiry because of newspaper reports about the types of
overly broad confidentiality provisions described above, as well as a
finding that an organization receiving significant funding from the
government required employees to enter into non-disparagement
agreements prohibiting employees from making any “derogatory,
disparaging, negative, critical or defamatory statements” to several
parties including “funding agencies” and “officials of any
government.”201 The organization had quickly revised its agreement
to clarify that the provision was “not meant to preclude former
employees from participating in a government audit, review, or
investigation.”202
The OIG sought to determine whether Department of State
contractors might have similar provisions that could limit
whistleblowing.203 The OIG inquiry found that all of the thirty
contractors had confidentiality agreements with their employees, but
that none of the policies specifically precluded disclosures to the
government.204 That said, at least thirteen contractors required
employees to notify the company if they are contacted by a
200. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 46, at 1.
201. Id. at 1–2.
202. Id. at 2.
203. See id. at 2–4 (noting that various federal laws and regulations encourage
disclosure of fraud by federal contractors and prohibit retaliation against contractor
employees who disclose fraud).
204. See id. at 5.
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government investigator.205 The OIG found that such provisions “may
have a chilling effect on employees who wish to report fraud, waste,
or abuse to a Federal official.”206 Accordingly, the OIG recommended
that federal contractors affirmatively inform employees of their right
to report wrongdoing to the federal government.207
In summary, these three federal agencies—the SEC, OSHA, and
the Department of State—all use different procedures to regulate
companies who use confidentiality agreements that may silence
employees who want to report on potential improprieties. The SEC is
using enforcement actions based on its Dodd-Frank regulations.
OSHA is using its power to approve settlement agreements. The
Department of State is willing to have its Office of Inspector General
investigate its contractor companies. Despite these different
approaches, the focus remains the same: the government will
challenge companies that try to undermine efforts to encourage and
protect whistleblowers.
CONCLUSION
As two co-authors and I argued previously, confidentiality
provisions prove especially troublesome as applied to whistleblowers
or would-be whistleblowers.208 When used as part of a severance or
settlement agreement in a whistleblowing case, such provisions can
appear as attempts to buy a whistleblower’s silence.209 An employee
receives a severance package or a settlement amount and, in return,
the agreement appears to put limitations on the employee’s ability to
disclose information to the government.210
It is difficult to ascertain how often employers use provisions in
agreements that might impede employees from reporting to the
government. There is anecdotal evidence that employers use such
provisions in severance agreements as indicated by the recent SEC
enforcement actions. There is also some empirical evidence that
settlement agreements in whistleblower cases often contain restrictive
confidentiality provisions; however, this evidence does not include
agreements after 2013. After that year, the SEC and OSHA became

205. See id. at 6.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 11.
208. See Moberly et al., supra note 48, at 91–92.
209. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM.
BUS. L.J. 151, 170–71 (1998).
210. See Bast, supra note 1, at 643–44.
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more outspoken in their view regarding the impropriety of such
measures.
What is clear, however, is that such provisions undermine the
recent focus of the federal government on encouraging
whistleblowers in order to better monitor corporate behavior. As a
result, several federal agencies, such as the SEC, OSHA, and the
Department of State OIG, have signaled that they intend to prioritize
whistleblowing over corporate confidentiality through aggressive
policing of problematic “de facto” gag clauses.
Looking ahead, the next round belongs to the corporate lawyers,
who no doubt will respond with even more creative ways to protect
their client’s legitimate interests in confidentiality and finality, while
trying not to run afoul of the federal watchdogs.211 And the
government’s reaction? It is still too early to tell whether federal
agencies in the Trump administration will continue to have a desire to
encourage whistleblowers.212 The laws, regulations, and precedent are
in place, but without individuals in government pushing to use them,
the sixteen-year trend of encouraging whistleblowing could come to
an end.

211. Cf. Eugene Scalia, Opinion, Blowing the Whistle on the SEC’s Latest Power Move,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eugene-scalia-blowing-thewhistle-on-the-secs-latest-power-move-1428271250 [https://perma.cc/2AXA-LRJS (dark
archive)] (questioning the propriety of the SEC’s limiting confidentiality agreements and
suggesting ways in which employers could fight the agency if it demanded confidential
information).
212. Cf. Moberly, supra note 7, at 45 (“Thus, the experience with Sarbanes-Oxley over
the last decade teaches that individual players in the system, such as organizational
supervisors, government administrators, and adjudicatory decision makers, impact
whistleblowers as much as, if not more than, any formal legal provisions.”).

